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Abstract: The coordination of multiple autonomous vehicles into convoys 
or 
platoons is expected on our highways in the near future. However, 
before such platoons can be deployed, the behaviours of the vehicles 
in these platoons must be certified. This is non-trivial and goes 
beyond current certification requirements, for human-controlled vehicles, 
in that these vehicles can act autonomously. In this paper, we show how  
formal verification can contribute to the analysis 
of these new, and increasingly autonomous, systems.  An appropriate 
overall representation for vehicle platooning is as a multi-agent 
system in which each agent captures the ``autonomous decisions'' 
carried out by each vehicle. In order to ensure that these autonomous 
decision-making agents in vehicle platoons never violate safety 
requirements, we use formal verification. However, as the formal 
verification technique used to verify the individual agent's code does 
not scale to the full system, and as the global system verification 
technique does not capture the essential verification of autonomous 
behaviour, we use a combination of the two approaches. This mixed 
strategy allows us to verify safety requirements not only of a model 
of the system, but of the actual agent code used to program the 
autonomous vehicles. 
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1 Highlights
• A combined methodology for the formal verification of autonomous
automotive platooning is proposed.
• Program model-checking is applied for verification of the ”actual” agent
code used in the implementation of platooning.
• A model of the agent code is extracted and used for the verification of
real-time properties fo the system.
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Formal Verification of Autonomous Vehicle Platooning
Maryam Kamalia, Louise A. Dennisa, Owen McAreeb, Michael Fishera, Sandor
M. Veresb
aDepartment of Computer Science, University of Liverpool, UK
bDepartment of Automatic Control & Systems Engineering, University of Sheffield, UK
Abstract
The coordination of multiple autonomous vehicles into convoys or platoons is ex-
pected on our highways in the near future. However, before such platoons can
be deployed, the behaviours of the vehicles in these platoons must be certified.
This is non-trivial and goes beyond current certification requirements, for human-
controlled vehicles, in that these vehicles can act autonomously. In this paper,
we show how formal verification can contribute to the analysis of these new, and
increasingly autonomous, systems. An appropriate overall representation for ve-
hicle platooning is as a multi-agent system in which each agent captures the “au-
tonomous decisions” carried out by each vehicle. In order to ensure that these
autonomous decision-making agents in vehicle platoons never violate safety re-
quirements, we use formal verification. However, as the formal verification tech-
nique used to verify the individual agent’s code does not scale to the full system,
and as the global system verification technique does not capture the essential ver-
ification of autonomous behaviour, we use a combination of the two approaches.
This mixed strategy allows us to verify safety requirements not only of a model of
the system, but of the actual agent code used to program the autonomous vehicles.
Keywords: vehicle platooning, agent programming, model checking
1. Introduction
While “driverless cars” regularly appear in the media, they are neither “driver-
less” nor fully autonomous. Legal constraints, such as the Vienna Convention [37],
ensure that there must always be a responsible human in the vehicle. Although
fully autonomous road vehicles remain futuristic, the automotive industry is work-
ing on what are variously called road trains, car convoys, or vehicle platoons.
Here, each vehicle autonomously follows the one in front of it, with the lead
Preprint submitted to Science of Computer Programming May 25, 2017
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vehicle in the platoon/convoy/train being controlled by a human driver. This tech-
nology is being introduced by the automotive industry in order to improve both
the safety and efficiency of vehicles on very congested roads [29]. It is especially
useful if the vehicles are trucks/lorries and if the road is a multi-lane highway.
In these platoons, each vehicle clearly needs to communicate with others, at
least with the ones immediately in front and immediately behind. Vehicle-to-
vehicle (V2V) communication is used at a lower (continuous control system) level
to adjust each vehicle’s position in the lanes and the spacing between the vehicles.
V2V is also used at higher levels, for example to communicate joining requests,
leaving requests, or commands dissolving the platoon. So a traditional approach
is to implement the software for each vehicle in terms of hybrid (and hierarchical)
control systems and to analyse this using hybrid systems techniques [4].
However, as these automotive platoons become more complex, there is a move
towards much greater autonomy within each vehicle. Although the human in the
vehicle is still responsible, the autonomous control deals with much of the com-
plex negotiation to allow other vehicles to leave and join, etc. Safety certification
is an inevitable concern in the development of more autonomous road vehicles,
and verifying the safety and reliability of automotive platooning is currently one
of the main challenges faced by the automotive industry. Traditional approaches
to modelling such situations involve hybrid automata [18] in which the continuous
aspects are encapsulated within discrete states, while discrete behaviours are ex-
pressed as transitions between these states. A drawback of the hybrid automaton
approach is that it can be difficult to separate the two (high-level decision-making
and continuous control) concerns. In addition, the representation of autonomous
decision-making can become unnecessarily opaque in such hybrid approaches.
As is increasingly common within autonomous systems, we use a hybrid ar-
chitecture where not only is the discrete decision-making component separated
from the continuous control system, but the behaviour of the discrete part is de-
scribed in much more detail; in particular, using the agent paradigm [40]. This
style of architecture improves the system design from an engineering perspective
and also facilitates system analysis and verification [9]. Indeed, we use this ar-
chitecture for actually implementing automotive platoons, and we will here show
how formal verification can be used for its direct analysis.
The verification of such systems is challenging due to their complex and hy-
brid nature. Separating discrete and continuous concerns, as above, potentially
allows us to reason about the decision-making components in isolation and en-
sure that no decision-making component ever deliberately chooses an unsafe state.
However, the use of the ‘agent’ concept alone is not enough for our purposes, since
2
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this can still make its autonomous decisions in an ‘opaque’ way. In order to be
able to reason about, and formally verify, the choices the system makes, we use
a rational agent [41]. This not only makes decisions, but has explicit representa-
tions of the reasons for making them, allowing us to describe not only what the
autonomous system chooses to do, but why it makes its particular choices [16].
We utilise the Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) model, one of the most widely
used conceptual models, not only for describing these rational agents but for ac-
tually implementing them [32]. A BDI-style agent is characterised by its beliefs,
desires and intentions: beliefs represent the agent’s views about the world; desires
represent the objectives to be accomplished; while intentions are the set of tasks
currently undertaken by the agent to achieve its desires. A BDI-style agent has
a set of plans, determining how an agent acts based on its beliefs and goals, and
an event queue where events (perceptions from the environment and internal sub-
goals) are stored. There are several advantages in using this style of model for de-
veloping autonomous systems: (a) it naturally separates feedback controllers from
high-level decision making, as above; (b) it facilitates reasoning and verifying
about the behaviour of high-level decision making [11]; (c) it supports incremen-
tal and hierarchical development of plans; and (d) it provides a clear separation
between plan selection and plan execution. However, a drawback of this form of
approach is that it is essentially a plan management and plan selection framework
with no in-built mechanisms for learning or first-principles planning. This means
that a BDI agent does not automatically learn from past behaviour and adapt its
plans accordingly. A similar limitation is lack of predictability and forward plan-
ning, in its basic form. As the aim of this paper is on verification of decisions
concerning platooning, we can utilise this model in the form of the GWENDOLEN
programming language [8], developed for verifiable BDI-style programming, to
capture and implement the agent-based decision-making in each vehicle within an
automotive platoon.
As part of safety verification, we need to verify the agent’s decisions, espe-
cially in combination with the other vehicles. An autonomous rational agent
makes decisions about what actions to perform, etc, based on the beliefs, goals and
intentions that the agent holds at that time. We use a model-checking approach
to demonstrate that the rational agent always behaves in line with the platoon re-
quirements and never deliberately chooses options that end up in unsafe states. We
verify properties of the rational agent code using the AJPF model-checker [12],
one of the very few model-checkers able to cope with complex properties of BDI
agents. Unfortunately, there are two drawbacks to using AJPF: currently, AJPF
does not support verification of timed behaviours; and AJPF is resource heavy
3
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and cannot be used to verify the whole system. Consequently, we here propose a
combined methodology for the verification of automotive platooning. To evalu-
ate timing behaviour, we use a timed-automata abstraction and verify the system
using Uppaal [2]; to evaluate individual autonomous decisions, we use AJPF to-
gether with an abstraction of the other vehicles/agents. Furthermore, we describe
how these two approaches to modelling can be combined to provide an appro-
priate basis for verifying the behaviour of both individual agents and the whole
system.
Overview of Our Contribution. The ISO 26262 standard provides a standard
for functional safety management in automotive applications, and determines the
safety requirements that should be fulfilled in design, development and validation
of individual automotive units. Following the ISO 26262 guidelines for safety
management in automotive applications we propose a verifiable agent-based ar-
chitecture for development of safe automotive platooning and, in the same re-
search line, we propose new combined verification techniques for autonomous
systems developed based on hybrid agent architectures. In particular, we show the
applicability of our verification techniques in the development of platooning.
For a clear picture of our approach, we summarize our fourfold contribution.
I We introduce formal automotive platoons requirements. This allows us to
better understand the functioning of platooning protocols and, more impor-
tantly, to verify essential properties such as the functional correctness and
liveness of the protocols. An important aspect of the protocols is that a
vehicle can join and leave a platoon if, and only if, the whole platooning
remains safe.
II We develop practical platooning protocols using a hybrid agent architecture
where the high-level decision-making component of the platooning proto-
cols is provided as Gwendolen agent code and the continuous control sys-
tem is provided as a Simulink model. This contributes to simulation and
testing of protocols for validation. The Simulink based control system was
developed under the assumption that the physical model in the simulation
is representative of real world vehicle dynamics. Exact correctness is not a
requirement, as the controller has been shown to be robust to unmodelled
dynamics [36, 27].
III We propose new combined verification techniques for the safety analysis of
systems which are developed using such hybrid agent architectures. This
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aims to separate different aspects of a system and the system properties,
i.e., BDI and real-time requirements in order to empower the verification of
complex autonomous systems.
IV We show how the proposed techniques for verification can be applied to
automotive platoon verification. Our description of this includes a brief
overview of the various types of models we use, in particular BDI agent
models and Uppaal models, that are used for verification of the various sys-
tem properties. Note that the verified BDI agent code is the actual code
which has been used for simulation1 and the real world testing2. This verifi-
cation has been carried out under the assumption that the vehicle control and
environment interactions are correct. This assumption is not restrictive be-
cause the vehicle control and environment interactions abstractly represent
our Simulink based control system and, to ensure the correct functionality
of the system control, an engineering analysis has been used [36, 27]. The
validity of our abstraction is checked by the simulation and testing, which
is discussed in II and any errors found there lead to improved abstractions.
Necessarily, real systems cannot be formally verified. Some abstractions
must be used, though it is important to continually improve these abstrac-
tions.
Overall, the approach described here can be used to formally verify practical au-
tonomous platooning systems.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 the automo-
tive platoon and platoon requirements are presented. In Section 3 the hybrid agent
architecture and the agent-based decision-making for the platoon are described.
In Section 4 the analysis and verification of the platoon is considered. Finally, in
Section 5, concluding remarks are provided.
2. Automotive Platoons
An automotive platoon, enabling road vehicles to travel as a group, is led by
a vehicle driven by a professional driver [35, 39, 34]. The following vehicles, i.e,
members of the platoon, are controlled autonomously. These vehicles, equipped
1 Platooning Simulation Demo
http://wordpress.csc.liv.ac.uk/va/2016/05/18/autonomous-vehicle-platooning-demo/
2 Real World Testing Demo
http://wordpress.csc.liv.ac.uk/va/2017/01/18/hw-testing-platooning/
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with low-level longitudinal (controlling speed) and lateral (controlling steering)
control systems, travel in a platoon with pre-defined gaps between them. In addi-
tion, V2V communication also connects the vehicles.The lead vehicle effectively
carries out coordination over the platoon: setting parameters, creating certificates
for joining and leaving, etc. Each individual vehicle observes its environment and
follows incoming commands from the lead vehicle. In what follows, we outline
the set of high-level automotive platoon concepts and procedures including how
to join and leave a platoon [3, 29] in Section 2.1 and Section 2.2, respectively.
In addition, the high-level requirements on these procedures for the development
of safe and reliable platooning are explained. From these we derive the formal
properties to be verified.
2.1. Joining the Platoon
A vehicle can join a platoon either at the end or in the middle with different
control strategies being used. The joining procedure is as follows:
• a non-member vehicle sends a joining request to the platoon leader, express-
ing the intended position in the platoon;
• if the vehicle has requested to join from the rear, the leader sends back an
agreement provided the maximum platoon length has not been reached and
the platoon is currently in normal operation, i.e, no other active joining/leav-
ing procedures are happening;
• if the vehicle requests to join in front of vehicle X and the maximum platoon
length has not been reached, the leader sends an “increase space” command
to vehicle X, and when the leader is informed that enough spacing has been
created, it sends back an agreement to the joining vehicle;
• upon receipt of an agreement, the joining vehicle changes its lane (changing
lane is a manual procedure which is performed by a human driver);
• once the vehicle is in the correct lane, its automatic speed controller is en-
abled and it approaches the preceding vehicle;
• when the vehicle is close enough to the preceding vehicle, its automatic
steering controller is enabled and it sends an acknowledgement to the leader;
and, finally,
• the leader sends a “decrease space” command to vehicle X, and when the
leader is informed that spacing has returned to normal, it replies to the ac-
knowledgement.
6
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
In order to ensure safe joining operations, the following requirements should be
preserved within the decision-making components of automotive platoon.
1. A vehicle must only initiate joining a platoon, i.e. changing lane, once it has
received confirmation from the leader.
2. Before autonomous control is enabled, a joining vehicle must approach the
preceding vehicle, in the correct lane.
3. Automatic steering controller must only be enabled once the joining vehicle
is sufficiently close to the preceding vehicle.
2.2. Leaving the Platoon
A vehicle can request to leave platoon at any time, i.e., a driver initiates a
leaving request. The leaving procedure is:
• a platoon member sends a leaving request to the leader and waits for autho-
risation;
• upon receipt of ‘leave’ authorisation, the vehicle increases its space from
the preceding vehicle;
• when maximum spacing has been achieved, the vehicle switches both its
speed and steering controller to ‘manual’ and changes its lane; and, finally
• the vehicle sends an acknowledgement to the leader.
Note that the detailed communications with the driver are abstracted away. It
means that the driver should be notified about the speed and steering controllers
that are switched to ‘manual’. As suggested in the EU legislation COMPA-
NYON [29], a control and tell-tale device would be needed to let the driver take
the vehicle control back and to inform the driver if (s)he is in the platoon. The
two following requirements are also necessary properties for ensuring safe leaving
operations that should be met with the agent-based decision-making components
of an automotive platoon.
1. Except in emergency cases, a vehicle must not leave the platoon without
authorisation from the leader.
2. When authorised to leave, autonomous control should not be disabled until
the maximum allowable platoon spacing has been achieved.
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Both leaving and joining procedures temporarily change the spacing of the
platoon in different parts that could endanger safety of the platoon. There could
be cases where the distance of two parts of the platoon would exceed the max-
imum permitted distance or a crash could be possible. An example scenario of
such cases can be as follows: when a vehicle increases the distance to that pre-
ceding it to leave the platoon and at the same time the vehicle right behind the
leaving vehicle increases its distance to let another vehicle to join to the platoon.
If the leaving vehicle leaves the platoon before the joining vehicle has joined, the
distance between two parts would be very large or a crash with the joining vehi-
cle would be plausible if the platoon tries to decrease this distance. The platoon
leader blocks the occurrence of both leaving and joining at the same time.
In the rest of the paper, we first explain our agent-based development of an
automotive platoon. The development is based on the procedures introduced in
Section 2. We then verify the correctness of joining and leaving procedures and
in general the safety of the whole platoon.
3. Agent-based Development of Automotive Platoon
We employ a hybrid agent architecture based on [10] for each vehicle:
Automotive 
Simulation 
Environment
Physical 
Engine
[ MATLAB/
Simulink ]
Abstraction
Agent
Decision
Making
Agent
[ TORCS ] [ MATLAB/Simulink ] [ Gwendolen ] [ Gwendolen ]
Fig. 1: Hybrid Agent Architecture
Real-time continuous control of the vehicle is managed by feedback controllers,
implemented in MATLAB. The real-time continuous control of the vehicle also
observes the environment through its sensory input. This is called the Physical
Engine. The Physical Engine, in turn, communicates with an Abstraction Agent
that extracts discrete information from streams of continuous data and passes
this on to a Decision-Making Agent. The Decision-Making Agent is a rational
agent which directs the Physical Engine by passing it instructions through the Ab-
straction Agent. Instructions from the Decision-Making Agent to the Abstraction
Agent are interpreted into meaningful instructions for the Physical Engine.
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To provide the complex environment necessary for effective simulation and
testing, we use an automotive simulator, TORCS3, to implement the environment
component of the architecture. The Physical Engine is implemented in MAT-
LAB, while both Abstraction and Decision-Making Agents are programmed in
the GWENDOLEN programming language. An interface between TORCS and
MATLAB/Simulink has been developed that provides a means to control vehicles
from MATLAB and Simulink4. In Section 3.1, we overview the GWENDOLEN
programming language along with the agent code for the joining scenario.
The Decision-Making Agent makes high-level decisions based on its beliefs,
goals, etc. These decisions are at the level of agreement, coarse vehicle com-
mands, communications, etc, and are translated, by the Abstraction Agent, to pro-
vide input for the Physical Engine. As the Physical Engine runs, real data and
activity is translated, again by the Abstraction Agent, into beliefs for the Decision-
Making Agent. An important part of the design process involves ensuring that all
relevant high-level commands and lower level controls are matched.
3.1. GWENDOLEN Programming Language
GWENDOLEN is a declarative logic-programming language incorporating ex-
plicit representations of goals, beliefs, and plans. Listing 1 shows some of the
GWENDOLEN code from the decision-making agent for the joining procedure for
a follower vehicle5.
GWENDOLEN uses many syntactic conventions from BDI agent languages.
We describe those needed to understand the example (the syntax is also sum-
marised in Fig. 2). : +!g indicates the addition of the goal g; +b indicates the
addition of the belief b; while  b indicates the removal of the belief. ⇤b indi-
cates that execution of a plan is suspended until the belief, b, becomes true. Plans
consist of three parts, with the pattern
t r i g g e r : gua rd <  body ;
The ‘ trigger ’ is the addition of a goal or a belief (beliefs may be acquired thanks
to the operation of perception and as a result of internal deliberation); the ‘guard’
3 TORCS- The Open Racing Car Simulator
https://sourceforge.net/projects/torcs/
4 TORCSLink- The interface between TORCS and Simulink
http://dx.doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.13943
5 The complete agent code is available at
https://github.com/VerifiableAutonomy/AgentPlatooning
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perform goal +!g [perform] adding a new goal to perform some actions
achievement +!g [achieve] adding a new goal and continuously attempting the
goal plans associated with the goal until the agent has
acquired the belief g
believe +b adding a new belief b
disbelieve -b removing a belief b
on-hold believe *b waiting for belief b to be true
plan trigger : guard body trigger is the addition of a goal or a belief; guard gives
conditions under which the plan can be executed; body
is a stack of actions that should be performed
guard condition B x checking if belief x is perceivable
guard condition G x checking if goal x has been added
action perf(x) action x causing the execution of x
Fig. 2: GWENDOLEN [8] Syntax
states conditions about the agent’s beliefs and goals which must be true before the
plan can become active; and the ‘body’ is a stack of ‘deeds’ the agent performs in
order to execute the plan. These deeds typically involve the addition and deletion
of goals and beliefs as well as actions (e.g., perf ( changing lane (1)) ) which refer
to code that is delegated to non-rational parts of the systems. Plans may contain
uninstantiated variables which we represent with upper-case letters, as is common
in logic programming languages. When a plan’s trigger is matched to a new belief
or goal this will generate a unifier that instantiates any variables in the trigger,
and evaluation of the plan’s guard may instantiate further variables. This unifier
is then applied to the body of the plan and this body is added to an intention that
already contained the trigger event.
A full operational semantics for GWENDOLEN is available in [7, 8] but in brief
a GWENDOLEN agent has a reasoning cycle that follows the characteristics of rea-
soning outlined by the BDI architecture [33]. The agent moves through this cycle
polling an external environment for perceptions and messages; converting these
into beliefs and creating intentions from any new beliefs; selecting an intention
for consideration (by default intentions are stored as a queue and the first in the
queue is selected); if the intention has no associated plan body then the agent
looks for a plan that matches the trigger event, extracted from the environment,
(and by default selects the first from the program that applies) and places the body
of this plan on the intention; the agent then processes the first deed on the intention
(e.g., adding or removing a belief, adding or removing a sub-goal, or performing
an action) and then places the intention at the end of the intention queue before
10
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performing perception once more.
1
2Reason ing Rules
3j o i n i n g (X, Y):  name (X) , p l a t oon ok
4
5P l an s
6+! j o i n i n g (X, Y) [ a c h i e v e ] : {B name (X) , ˜B j o i n a g r e eme n t (X, Y)}
7<  +! s p e e d c o n t r ( 0 ) [ pe r fo rm ] , +! s t e e r i n g c o n t r ( 0 ) [ pe r fo rm ] ,
8. send ( l e a d e r , : t e l l , j o i n r e q (X, Y) ) , ⇤ j o i n a g r e eme n t (X, Y ) ;
9
10+! j o i n i n g (X, Y) [ a c h i e v e ] : {B name (X) , B j o i n a g r e eme n t (X, Y) ,
11˜B changed l ane , ˜G s e t s p a c i n g (Z ) [ a c h i e v e ]}
12<  +! s p e e d c o n t r ( 0 ) [ pe r fo rm ] , +! s t e e r i n g c o n t r ( 0 ) [ pe r fo rm ] ,
13p e r f ( c h a n g i n g l a n e ( 1 ) ) , ⇤ c h ang ed l a n e ;
14
15+! j o i n i n g (X, Y) [ a c h i e v e ] : {B name (X) , B j o i n a g r e eme n t (X, Y) ,
16B changed l ane , ˜B s p e e d c o n t r , ˜ B s t e e r i n g c o n t r ,
17˜B j o i n i n g d i s t a n c e , ˜G s e t s p a c i n g (Z ) [ a c h i e v e ]}
18<  +! s p e e d c o n t r ( 1 ) [ pe r fo rm ] , ⇤ j o i n i n g d i s t a n c e ;
19
20+! j o i n i n g (X, Y) [ a c h i e v e ] : {B name (X) , B j o i n a g r e eme n t (X, Y) ,
21B changed l ane , B s p e e d c o n t r , ˜B s t e e r i n g c o n t r ,
22B j o i n i n g d i s t a n c e , ˜G s e t s p a c i n g (Z ) [ a c h i e v e ]}
23<  +! s t e e r i n g c o n t r ( 1 ) [ pe r fo rm ] ;
24
25+! j o i n i n g (X, Y) [ a c h i e v e ] : {B name (X) , B j o i n a g r e eme n t (X, Y) ,
26B changed l ane , ˜B s p e e d c o n t r , ˜B s t e e r i n g c o n t r ,
27B j o i n i n g d i s t a n c e , ˜G s e t s p a c i n g (Z ) [ a c h i e v e ]}
28<  +! s p e e d c o n t r ( 1 ) [ pe r fo rm ] , +! s t e e r i n g c o n t r ( 1 ) [ pe r fo rm ] ;
29
30+! j o i n i n g (X, Y) [ a c h i e v e ] : {B name (X) , B j o i n a g r e eme n t (X, Y) ,
31B changed l ane , B s p e e d c o n t r , B s t e e r i n g c o n t r ,
32B j o i n i n g d i s t a n c e , ˜B pla toon m , ˜G s e t s p a c i n g (Z ) [ a c h i e v e ]}
33<  . send ( l e a d e r , : t e l l , message (X, j o i n e d s u c c ) ,
34⇤pla toon m , + p l a t oon ok ;
Listing 1: A Follower Vehicle’s code
Plan guards are evaluated using Prolog-style reasoning. The statement B b
is true if either b unifies with a ground literal in the agent’s belief base, or there
exists a reasoning rule of the form h :  body where h unifies with b and body is a
conjunction of literals which in turn either unify with a literal in the agent’s belief
base or can be deduced via further reasoning rules. Similarly the statement G g
is true if g unifies with a ground literal in the agent’s goal base, or there exists a
reasoning rule from which it can be deduced. Negation is indicated with ˜ and its
semantics are negation by failure as in Prolog. Listing 1 contains one reasoning
rule (line 3) which allows the agent to deduce the truth of joining (X, Y) for
some X and Y if the agent’s name is X and it believes platoon ok (a belief that
is asserted by the final plan in the listing).
11
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
Thus the first plan in Listing 1 (Lines 6-8) states that if the follower agent gains
a goal to join the platoon (+! joining (X, Y)) and its name is X (B name(X)) and
it does not yet have a joining agreement (˜ B join agreement (X, Y)), then it sets
its speed and steering controls into state 0 (manual control) and sends a request to
the leader to join the platoon. It then waits for an agreement to be received.
GWENDOLEN uses two types of goals, achieve goals and perform goals (in-
dicated by the keywords [ achieve ] and [perform] in plans). An achieve goal
indicates a state of the world that the agent wishes to bring about and these goals
persist until they are achieved. So, in the case of the first plan, after the join agree-
ment is received another plan may be attempted for the trigger +! joining (X, Y)
if the belief joining (X, Y) is not yet deducible from agent’s belief base and rea-
soning rules. Perform goals, on the other hand, represent sub-procedures. They
are matched to a plan which is then executed and the goal removed without any
check that they have succeeded. +! speed contr (0) and +! steering contr (0)
in the first plan are perform goals – the agent simply enacts the relevant actions
required to switch the control systems.
The second plan in Listing 1 (Lines 10-13) can be executed if, and only if, the
follower agent believes it has a join agreement but does not yet believe that the
agent has successfully changed lane nor that the agent currently has a goal to set
a particular spacing between cars. Each of the subsequent plans in Listing 1 is
executed in a slightly different circumstance. When a lane change goes smoothly,
each plan gets executed at most once. However if something goes wrong, for
instance the join agreement is revoked halfway through the manoeuvre, then an
earlier plan may be executed again (e.g., if the join agreement is revoked then the
agent returns the speed and steering controls to manual and requests a new join
agreement from the leader).
The protocol embodied by the plans for achieving joining (X, Y) is that a lane
change manoeuvre starts with manual control of speed and steering. A request to
join the platoon is sent. When an agreement is received a lane change manoeuvre
is performed. Once the lane is successfully changed there are two options, if the
car is the appropriate distance from the one in front the automated systems take
control of both speed and steering. If the car is not at the appropriate distance
then the automated systems take control of the speed until an appropriate distance
is achieved and then take control of the steering. At this point (the car is in the
correct lane, the correct distance from the car in front and the automated systems
are in full control) the agent sends a message to the leader confirming a successful
manoeuvre, awaits receipt of confirmation from the leader and then asserts an
internal belief that the platoon is now OK.
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The BDI model is a useful paradigm for goal-oriented scenarios such as au-
tomotive platooning as the system reasons over different goals and intelligently
selects plans to achieve them, removes and adds new goals, and through the exe-
cution of plans can commit to its intentions for achieving goals. This makes the
BDI model a suitable approach for making high-level decisions in systems with
complex goals, employed in dynamically changing environment. However, a lim-
itation of the BDI model is in generation of new plans on demand. This is not part
of the core approach but can be tackled, for example, by integrating a module for
the generation of plans via partial observable Markov decision process (POMDP)
with the BDI model [28]. However, this is out of our paper’s scope and we assume
the agent’s plan library is fixed.
4. Verification
This section presents the verification of the automotive platooning. We start
by overviewing our verification methodology in Section 4.1 where the verification
task is divided to two main parts: agent behaviour and real-time requirement of the
system. We apply our methodology for verification of automotive platoon in the
rest of sub-sections. In Section 4.2, the agent behaviour is verified using AJPF. To
verify the real-time requirement of the system, we use the Uppaal model checker
where a system is represented as timed automata. To generate timed automata for
the system, first in Section 4.3 we introduce a translation algorithm that generates
a timed automaton from an agent model by abstracting the internal states of the
agent. Then in Section 4.4, we describe our Uppaal model of the system followed
with its verification in Section 4.5. In the last part of the section, we discuss the
validation of verification.
4.1. Verification Methodology
We can visualise the overall platoon system as shown in Fig. 3.
Comms AgentComms AgentComms Agent
Fig. 3: Overall Platoon System
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The agent is a GWENDOLEN program, the Comms component is a simple trans-
fer protocol, and the vehicle represents the particular vehicular system that we
interact with. This is typically an automotive control system together with envi-
ronmental interactions, and we have validated this both in simulation (using the
TORCS automotive simulation) and in physical vehicles (using Jaguar outdoor
rover vehicles).
Limits to Modelling/Verification. We are not going to formally verify the vehic-
ular control systems, and leave this to standard mathematical (usually analytic)
techniques from the Control Systems field [27]. These control components, for
example involving following a prescribed path, avoiding local obstacles, keeping
distance from objects, etc, are well-established and standard. Instead, we will ver-
ify the autonomous decisions the vehicles make, captured within each vehicle’s
‘agent’ [16]. Each agent represents the autonomous decision-maker within each
vehicle and corresponds, in part, to the human driver’s decisions. These decisions
involve deciding where to go, when to turn, when to stop, what to do in unexpected
situations, etc. In the case of autonomous vehicle convoys/platoons, the agent’s
(and, hence, the vehicle’s) decisions concern when to join the convoy, when to
leave, what to do in an emergency, etc.
So, we begin by abstracting from all the vehicle control systems and environ-
mental interactions, representing these by one (potentially complex, depending on
the vehicle/environment interactions) automaton. We also use an automaton to de-
scribe the simple transfer protocol that the vehicles use for their communication.
In both these cases we will use Timed Automata [1]. Simplified, in the sense that
the abstraction aspects, continuous control, and environmental considerations are
all bundled in to “Vehicle Control and Environment”, our architecture is:
Communications Agent
Program
Communications
Vehicle Control 
and Environment
Agent
Program
Communications
Vehicle Control 
and Environment
which, abstracts to an overarching formal model:
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Timed 
Automaton AgentAutomaton
Timed
Automaton
Timed
Automaton
Agent
Automaton
Timed
Automaton
Timed
Automaton
Simplified timed automata of our architecture are given in Table 16. The com-
munication automaton represents the required communications for an agent to
receive a join agreement namely, receiving a join request from an agent and send-
ing back a join agreement. The vehicle automaton represents the behaviour of a
vehicle when it receives a “changing lane” command from the agent. The agent
automaton represents a simplified behaviour of an agent for joining to the platoon.
Transitions between locations are synchronised through rcv and snd channels. For
instance, when the agent automaton send a join request (snd(j req)), it synchro-
nises with rcv(j req) of the communication automaton.
Table 1: An example of timed and untimed automata of the platooning
Communication Timed Automaton Vehicle Timed Automaton
a brcv(j_req)t < expiry_time; snd(j_ack)
a b
rcv(change_lane(1))
t < expiry_time; snd(changed_lane)
t > expiry_time
Agent Automaton.pdf
a
bsnd(j_req) c
rcv(j_ack) d
e
rcv(changed_lane)
f
continues the rest of procedure
snd(change_lane(1))
In describing agent behaviour, the agent automaton incorporates the dimen-
sions of belief and intention, allowing representation of rational agent behaviour.
Thus, the formal structures that allow us to fully represent the whole system above
are quite complex, combining timed relations as well as relations for each of the
belief and intention dimensions [31, 1]. We will not describe this formal model
in detail but just note that it is a fusion [15, 17, 25] of timed and BDI structures,
6 The full model of timued automata is available at
https://github.com/VerifiableAutonomy/AgentPlatooning
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hL,A,C, E , inv, RB, RI , li. Here: L is a finite set of locations; A is a finite set of
actions; C is a finite set of clocks, for the timed aspect; E ✓ L⇥ (C)⇥A⇥2C⇥L
is a set of (timed) edges between locations, where  (C) is a set of simple clock
constraints such as “c < 4”; inv : L !  (C) is a function associating each
location with some clock constraint in  (C); RB : Ag ! (L ⇥ L) provides the
belief relation between locations for agents in Ag; RI : Ag ! (L⇥ L), intention
relation for agents between locations; and l : L ! 2AP is a labelling function es-
sentially capturing those propositions true at each location (AP is a set of atomic
propositions).
The logic is then interpreted over such structures combining [17] the syntax of
timed temporal logic, for example }5finish (i.e., ”eventually within 5 seconds
finish holds”), and the syntax of modal logics of belief, desire and intention, for
example Bxstarted (i.e. “agent x believes that started is true”).
In principle, though very complex, we could provide all our platoon requirements
in such a logic, build structures of the above form for our platoon implementation,
and then develop a model-checking approach for this combination [24]. How-
ever, there are several reasons we choose to abstract and separate the timed/agent
strands, as follows.
(I) For certification it is important that we verify the actual agent program used
in each vehicle, not a derived model of this. Consequently, we utilise a
program model checking [38] approach to assess the correctness of each
agent program. Program model checking analyses the actual code in detail
rather than generating a further finite state model to represent it. For this
formal verification of the agent’s autonomous decisions, we use AJPF [12],
an extension of the Java PathFinder (JPF) program model checker [23] for
GWENDOLEN that allows verification of belief/intention properties. This is
the only program model-checker for rational agents.
(II) We do not have the detailed implementations of all the communication pro-
tocols, the vehicular controls, and environmental interactions, and so must
use an abstract, formal model to describe these, rather than actual code.
This allows us to narrow the verification to only the agent program but with
the cost of losing the generality of results. Our abstraction dictates what the
above components should do without looking at how they perform those
actions.
(III) JPF is an explicit-state program-checker and is relatively slow; AJPF builds
a BDI programming layer on top of JPF and is at least an order of magnitude
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slower than JPF. Consequently, AJPF cannot realistically be used for verifi-
cation of the whole system. In addition, as AJPF does not yet have real-time
capabilities, then verifying timing aspects within AJPF is difficult.
While these appear problematic, there are several useful simplifications in our
context:
• When verifying autonomous behaviour, the formal verification we carry out
concerns the interaction of beliefs, intentions, etc, within each agent. These
do not extend between agents and so, checking of beliefs, intentions, etc,
can be localised within each agent.
• In the requirements to be checked, the timed and BDI formulae are quite
separate, i.e. }5finish ^Bxstarted but never}5Bxstarted orBx}5finish.
As the overall logic is a fusion, and since there are no explicit timing con-
straints within an agent program (agents have fast internal computation),
this allows us to deal with the timing and agent dimensions separately.
So, given an overall system, S, over which we wish to check ', then we reduce
S |= ' to two problems:
1. for each individual agent, Ai, within S, verify the agent properties from ',
i.e. 'a, on the agent within an untimed environment (an over-approximation)
which addresses the concerns given in (I) and (III); and
2. verify the timing properties from ' i.e. 't, on the whole system where the
agent program is replaced by a timed automaton describing solely its input-
output behaviour (abstracting from internal BDI reasoning) which addresses
the problems given in (II).
We explain both of these in more detail, before giving the relevant theorems.
Timed Automaton  ! Untimed Automaton. This is essentially achieved by over-
approximation. By removing timing constraints from automata transitions, we
can still move between the same states but there are no timing restrictions on this
movement. If we do this systematically, as in Fig. 4, then the new system rep-
resents an over-approximation of the original as more behaviours are allowable.
Timed 
Automaton:
Comms
Agent
Program: Ai
Timed
Automaton:
Vi
Untimed 
Automaton:
Comms’
Agent
Program: Ai
Untimed
Automaton:
Vi’
ABSTRACT
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Fig. 4: Timed Automaton to Untimed Automaton
Note that going from a timed automaton to an untimed one, for example re-
placing behaviours such as}3receive by}receive provides this over-approximation.
Hence, for example, Comms 0 |= ' implies Comms |= ', but not necessarily the
converse. This then allows us to verify7 V 0i kComms 0kAi |= 'a using AJPF as
detailed timing is removed in the vehicle and communications models.
Taking the example in Table 1, the untimed automata in Table 2 are the result
of timing removal for the communication and vehicle timed automata. Note that
the Comms 0 and V 0i communicates with Ai through message passing.
Table 2: An example of untimed automata of Comm and Vi
Communication Untimed Automaton Vehicle Untimed Automaton
a brcv(j_req)                 snd(j_ack)          a b
rcv(change_lane(1))
              snd(changed_lane)            
Agent Model  ! Untimed Automaton. Formal verification, via model checking,
of an agent program [11] carries out by exploring all possible states of an agent
model. While the exploration is performing, a model of agent behaviour can be
gardually built. This model is a BDI automaton incorporating all the temporal,
belief, and intention aspects of the agent. Now we will abstract from the agent
aspects to build a simple automaton where all the belief/intention updates are ig-
nored. This then just corresponds to the basic I/O behaviour of the agent.
Timed 
Automaton:
Comms
Agent
Program: Ai
Timed
Automaton:
Vi
Timed 
Automaton:
Comms
Untimed
Automaton: Ai’
Timed
Automaton:
Vi
ABSTRACT
Fig. 5: Agent Model to Untimed Automaton
Formal verification using Uppaal can then carried out on the whole system with
all agents abstracted by substituting with untimed automata. In this abstraction,
Comms and Vi communicate with A0i through synchronisation channels.
7 Note that the parallel composition operator || is deliberately generic to simplify description.
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We now provide proof sketches for properties of the above abstractions. For sim-
plicity, we assume that S consists of just two agents/vehicles; this result can then
easily be generalised to greater numbers of agents/vehicles. Below, recall that:
• V1 and V2 are timed automata representing the vehicle control, while V 01 and
V 02 are untimed abstractions of these;
• A1 and A2 are BDI automata representing the agents making decisions,
while A01 and A02 are abstractions of these with BDI elements removed; and
• Comms12 is a timed automaton representing the inter-vehicle communica-
tions, while Comms12 0 is an untimed abstraction of this (a standard Bu¨chi
automaton).
Theorem 1. Let S == V1 k A1 k Comms12 k A2 k V2. If
a) V 01 k A1 k Comms12 0 |= 'a and
b) V 02 k A2 k Comms12 0 |= 'a and
c) V1 k A01 k Comms12 k A02 k V2 |= 't.
then S |= 'a ^ 't.
Proof Sketch. Since V 01 and Comms12
0 are over-approximations, the behaviours
of V 01 include all behaviours of V1 and the behaviours of Comms12
0 include all
behaviours of Comms12 , and so
V 01kA1kComms12 0 |= 'a implies V1kA1kComms12 |= 'a.
Similarly, (b) gives us V2kA2kComms12 |= 'a. As the agent properties in 'a
are local, we can compose these to give V1kA1kComms12kA2kV2 |= 'a and so
S |= 'a.
By (c) we know that V1kA01kComms12kA02kV2 |= 't yet, contain no timing
constraints to begin with, we know that A01 and A02 give us exactly the same timed
behaviours. Thus A1 and A01 are equivalent wrt 't, as are A2 and A02. Conse-
quently, V1kA1kComms12kA2kV2 |= 't and so S |= 't. These two together give
us S |= 'a ^ 't.
Theorem 2. If V1 k A1 k Comms12 k A2 k V2 |= 't
then V1 k A01 k Comms12 k A02 k V2 |= 't.
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Proof Sketch. Since the timing behaviour of each Ai is identical to each A0i then
V1kA01kComms12kA02kV2
and
V1kA1kComms12kA2kV2
are equivalent.
As we mentioned earlier, V 01 , V 02 , and Comms12 0 are over-approximation, and
so
V1k A1 k Comms12 k A2k V2 |= 'adoes not necessarily imply
V 01 k A1 k Comms12 0 k A2 k V 02 |= 'a.
In summary, we abstract from timing behaviours in vehicle and communication
models so that we can carry out (untimed) verification of these in combination
with the agent, and (separately) abstract form detailed BDI behaviours in the agent
so we can verify timed behaviours of the combination of original communications
model, original vehicle model, and abstracted agent. This is feasible since, in our
application, BDI behaviours only occur within agents and the agent itself does not
contribute to timing delays.
4.2. Individual Agent Verification using AJPF
To verify individual agent properties, we use the AJPF model checker on our
agent, written in the GWENDOLEN language, as above. For instance, we verify
that:
If a vehicle never believes it has received confirmation from the leader,
then it never initiates joining to the platoon.
This safety property corresponds to the first requirement of joining a platoon,
as given in Section 2, and can be defined as:
2 (G f3 platoon m (f3, f1)
! ¬Df3 perf(changing lane(1))W Bf3 join agr (f3, f1))
(1)
Here f3 refers to a non-member vehicle which tries to join the platoon, in front of
member vehicle f1. Gx y stands for a goal y that agent x tries to achieve, Bx z
20
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stands for a belief z of agent x, and Dx k stands for an action k that agent x
performs/does. The standard LTL operators, such as 2 meaning “always in the
future” and W meaning “unless”, are used. An instance of the above where the
agent never receives a join agreement, is:
2 (G f3 platoon m (f3, f1) &¬B f3 join agr (f3, f1))
! 2¬D f3 perf(changing lane(1))
(2)
To be able to check such a property, incoming perceptions and communications
should be provided. One way to provide such inputs is to generate them randomly.
However, the whole combination of incoming perceptions and communications is
significant and consequently the property checking is infeasible. Another way
to provide incoming perceptions and communications is to represent input com-
binations that are viable from the practical vehicle behaviour. This often makes
the property checking feasible. Thus, we supply two automata: Comm0, repre-
senting communication to and from the other agents; and V 0i , representing vehicle
responses to agent actions. The latter solution for providing incoming perceptions
and communications, on one hand, removes all possibilities for providing irrel-
evant inputs by mimicking a real model of the communication and vehicle con-
troller and decreases the verification time. On the other hand, it does not ensure
the correctness of the agent code against completely unanticipated input. Under
this configuration, we were able to carry out the agent verification in around 20
minutes. (Recall that AJPF is very resource hungry.) Note that we can, with addi-
tional resources, weaken expectations on the environment and so verify the agent
in increasingly unlikely scenarios.
We have verified a range of safety and liveness properties and we provide
some joining and leaving examples below. Note that the following properties can
also be similarly expressed in terms of the weak until operator, W ; however, we
denote a particular instance of these properties for the sake of brevity.
If a vehicle ever sends a ‘join’ request to the leader and eventually
receives the join agreement and it is not already in the correct lane, it
initiates ‘joining’ the platoon by performing “changing lane”.
2 ( G f3 platoon m (f3, f1) & ¬B f3 changed lane &
2 (ItD f3send(leader, tell, message(f3, 1, f1))! ⌃ B f3 join agr (f3, f1)))
! ⌃ D f3 perf(changing lane(1))
(3)
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Property 3 is a liveness property ensuring that eventually the joining procedure
initiates the changing lane control system once its condition is fulfilled. Similarly,
we can verify other properties to show progress such as “eventually the speed and
steering controllers are switched to automatic if pre-conditions hold”. Some other
verified properties ensuring safe operation of the platoon are as follows.
If a vehicle never believes it has changed its lane, then it never switches
to the automatic speed controller.
2 ( G f3 platoon m (f3, f1) & ¬B f3 changed lane )
! 2 ¬D f3 perf(speed controller(1))
(4)
If a vehicle never believes it has received a confirmation from the
leader, then it never switches to the automatic speed controller.
2 ( G f3 platoon m (f3, f1) & ¬B f3 join agr (f3, f1) )
! 2 ¬D f3 perf(speed controller(1))
(5)
If a vehicle never believes it is sufficiently close to the preceding ve-
hicle, it never switches to the automatic steering controller.
2 ( G f3 platoon m (f3, f1) & ¬B f3 joining distance )
! 2 ¬D f3 perf(steering controller(1))
(6)
If a vehicle never believes it has received a confirmation from the
leader to leave the platoon, i.e., increasing spacing has been achieved,
then it never disables its autonomous control.
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Note that the leader sends back the ‘leave’ agreement to follower3 if, and only
if, it received an acknowledgement from follower3 showing that spacing has been
increased.
2 (G f3 leave platoon & ¬B f3 leave agr (f3))
! 2 ¬D f3 perf(speed controller(0))
(7)
It is important to recall that perceptions and communications coming in to the
agent are represented as internal beliefs. Hence the proliferation of belief oper-
ators. The AJPF program model checker explores all possible combinations of
shared beliefs and messages and so, even with the relatively low number of per-
ceptions above, the combinatorial explosion associated with exploring all possi-
bilities is very significant. Therefore, verifying the whole multi-agent platooning
system using AJPF is infeasible.
As explained in Section 4.1, to verify the global properties of multi-agent pla-
tooning, we use a complementary approach. We generate a model of the whole
system as timed-automata and use the Uppaal model checker to establish the
(timed) correctness of multi-agent platooning. In the following, we review the
relevant timed-automata and highlight some of the global safety properties of ve-
hicle platooning that have been verified using Uppaal.
4.3. From Agent Model to Untimed Automata
In this section we define our algorithm for extracting an untimed automaton
from an agent model. First, we generate a state model of an agent model through
the execution of the AJPF model checker. In every state we have a set of beliefs,
intentions, actions, and messages which can represent either the internal state of
the agent, or the input/output information from/to the environment. The environ-
ment is an abstract representation of a vehicle and other agents, in this context. For
automaton generation only the input/output information is required. Therefore, we
remove superfluous information from the state model and merge equivalent states,
as described in Algorithm 1. Our approach is similar to the automata minimisa-
tion algorithms [21, 22], where equivalent states are identified for a deterministic
finite automata A. Equivalent states are merged to build the states of the minimal
automaton A0.
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Algorithm 1 Agent Model to Untimed Automaton Algorithm
1: translateAgentToAutomaton(S,E)
Input: a state model A, representing as a graph G = (S,E)
Output: a minimized state model A0, representing as (S000, E000)
2: (S0, E) = STRIPINTERNALBELIEFS(S,E)
3: (S00, E00) = REMOVEEMPTY(S0, E))
4: (S000, E000) = MATCHANDMERGEDUPLICATES(S00, E00)
5: function STRIPINTERNALBELIEFS(S,E)
6: S0 = ;
7: for each s 2 S do
8: s0 = s with all internal beliefs and intentions removed
9: s00 = s0 with all remaining beliefs and messages converted to propositions
10: S0 = S0 [ {s00}
11: end for
12: return (S0, E)
13: end function
14: function REMOVEEMPTY(S,E)
15: S0 = S, E0 = E
16: for each s 2 S0 do
17: if prop(s) = ; then
18: E0 = (E0 [ {(x, y) | x 2 in(s) ^ y 2 out(s)})
\({(x, s) | x 2 in(s)} [ {(s, y) | y 2 out(s)})
19: S0 = S0 \ {s}
20: end if
21: end for
22: return (S0, E0)
23: end function
24: function MATCHANDMERGEDUPLICATES(S,E)
25: S0 = S, E0 = E
26: for each si 2 S0 do
27: for each sj 2 S0 \ {si} do
28: if out(si) = out(sj) and prop(si) = prop(sj) then
29: E0 = (E0 [ {(sin, si) | sin 2 in(sj)})
\({(sj , sout) | sout 2 out(sj)} [ {(sin, sj) | sin 2 in(sj)})
30: S0 = S0 \ {sj}
31: end if
32: end for
33: end for
34: return (S0, E0)
35: end function
The STRIPINTERNALBELIEFS function updates the set of states (S) by firstly
removing all internal beliefs and intentions, and then converting beliefs and ac-
tions representing input/output information to propositions. Typically, this re-
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places belief formulae such as B xyz by propositions such as bel xyz . The RE-
MOVEEMPTY function checks the propositions of states. For every empty state,
the set of edges (E) is updated by redirecting the incoming and outgoing edges
of the empty state. The set of states (S) is updated by removing the isolated
empty state. The MATCHANDMERGEDUPLICATES function finds all states hav-
ing equivalent outgoing edges and propositions. The set of edges (E) is updated
by redirecting the incoming edges of equivalent states. The isolated equivalent
state is then removed from the set of states.
The agent model consists of 28 beliefs, 14 actions/messages, and 12 goals.
In total, 22 beliefs, actions, and messages can be converted to propositions that
represent input/output information. The generated state model of the agent code
consists of 1396 states and 2361 transitions. The failure of the communication
component, represented by the Comms 0 automaton, has not been considered in
the generation of the state model. Reliable communication plays a key role in
safety of platooning. If the communication is unreliable, the platoon dissolves
and consequently any joining and leaving operation will be stopped. In other
words, we can only guarantee the correctness of joining and leaving protocols
under reliable communication condition. In contrast, some failures of the vehicle
(represented as the V 0i automaton), namely the failure to change lanes, have been
included in the model. Changing lane is a procedure that a driver performs and
can go wrong due to human error. Therefore, in order to have a realistic design,
we consider human error. As the platooning scenarios are sequential and involve
disjoint sets of events, a generated automaton from the agent model should consist
of at least 22 states.
The output of Algorithm 1 shows that 650 states, out of 1396 generated states
of the agent code, are empty states which are removed by the REMOVEEMPTY
function. The MATCHANDMERGEDUPLICATES function reduces the number of
states and transitions to 174 and 519, respectively. To optimise the output of Al-
gorithm 1, two more reduction functions are introduced that are shown in Fig. 6.
The first function finds states whose outgoing edges are to states with equivalent
propositions, and redirects all the incoming edges and removes isolated states.
Two states 129 and 145 in Fig. 6 (2-3) are merged with 127 using this reduction.
The second function finds cases as shown in Fig. 6 (4) where a state with equiva-
lent propositions, i.e., state 126, redirects its incoming state 125 to state 127 which
is directly connected to 125. As we do not take into account timing aspects here,
moving between identical states, then these can be merged. This simplification
reduces the number of states and transitions to 89 and 560, respectively. The re-
duction functions are repeatedly executed until the numbering of states converges
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to a size of 34.
125
126
127
129
145
125 126
129
127
145
(1)	 (2)	 (3)	
125 127
126
129
145
125 127
126
129
145
125 127
126
129
145
(4)	
125
126
127
129
145
Fig. 6: A reduction example
The Uppaal agent automaton shown in Fig. 7 is composed of 29 locations
which are extracted from the output of Algorithm 1. Note that the Uppaal agent
automaton has been generated manually since the generated state transition by
AJPF had to be adapted to Uppaal locations and transitions. For instance, AJPF
generates states at the end of each reasoning cycle, i.e., a generated state can
consist of new beliefs and a performing action. This means that a state generated
form the agent code can be transformed to two consecutive locations in Uppaal
with two synchronisation channels which represent a new belief and a performing
action. Furthermore, the output of Algorithm 1 is an untimed automaton that
needs to be supplemented with timing requirements.
4.4. Timed Automata Model of Automotive Platoons
We model vehicle platooning in Uppaal as a parallel composition of identical
processes describing the behaviour of each individual vehicle in the platoon along
with an extra process describing the behaviour of the platoon leader (the leader
automaton). Each of these vehicle processes is a parallel composition of two
timed automata, the vehicle control and environment and agent. The Uppaal agent
automaton 8, in turn, comprises both Comms and A0i components, as described in
Section 4.1. This means that the timing requirements of Comms component are
added to untimed transitions of A0i to model the Uppaal agent automaton.
The vehicle automaton supplies incoming perceptions for the Uppaal agent
automaton. It describes the sensor models and action execution. The vehicle
8 The full Uppaal model is available at
https://github.com/VerifiableAutonomy/AgentPlatooning
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automaton receives, and responds to, the action commands of the correspond-
ing agent through six pairs of binary channels modelling change-lane, set-space,
speed-manual/auto and steering-manual/auto commands and responses. To model
timing behaviour, we define a clock for the vehicle automaton which models the
time assessments for “changing lane”, “setting space” and “speed auto” actions.
Engineering analysis of the stability and robustness of the low level, continuous
controllers has been used to ensure that these systems function correctly, within
certain bounds [36, 27]. These bounds correspond to quantities such as accel-
eration and lateral velocity which subsequently impose constraints on the tim-
ing of decisions. Based on these analysis, actions speed-manual and steering-
manual/auto happen immediately and actions change-lane, set-space and speed-
auto take 20 ± 5, 10 ± 5 and 10 ± 5 seconds, respectively. For instance, the
speed-auto action completes in 5 seconds in the best case and in 15 seconds in
the worst case. It means when the Uppaal agent automaton sends a speed-auto
command to the vehicle, it should wait between 5 to 15 seconds for close-enough
response. Note that timing values are parameters of the timed automata and can be
adjusted based on the type of vehicles. In other words, tuning the timing values in
the timed automata model and system properties do not impact on the verification
result of the automotive platoon.
The Uppaal agent automaton models an abstracted version of the GWEN-
DOLEN agent by excluding all internal computations of the agent and added time
constraints of Comms . The overall structure of an Uppaal agent consists of 5
regions, shown in Fig. 7. These regions are extracted from the output of Algo-
rithm 1.
If the automaton is in the IDLE region, which consists of only one loca-
tion, then the agent does not perform any action at that moment. The regions
JOIN, LEAVE, SET-SPACE and SW-STEERING represent the sequence of neces-
sary communications with other agents (and the vehicle) in order to achieve the
agent’s goals. Each agent automaton contains two binary channels join-r[i][0]
and leave-r[i][0] to model the unicast sending of ‘join’ and ‘leave’ requests to
the leader and two binary channels joined-suc[i][0] and left-suc[i][0] to model
the unicast sending of ‘join’ and ‘leave’ acknowledgements to the leader. These
channels are used to model the message passing between the following agents
and the leader, modelled in the decision-making agent (Section. 3). Furthermore,
each agent automaton also contains channels to send commands to its vehicle and
receive acknowledgements from its vehicle. The agent automaton has a clock
process-time that is used to model the time consumption for achieving goals.
Next, we define a leader automaton to model the external behaviour of the
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Fig. 7: Example Uppaal Agent Automaton
leader agent (Fig. 8), where the coordination between agents is handled through
unicast synchronisation channels. Upon receipt of a joining request, i.e., join-
r[i][0]!, it sends a “set spacing” command to the preceding agent where the re-
quested agent wants to be placed. The leader sends a joining agreement, i.e., join-
agr-c[0][i]?, to the requested agent, if it has successfully set spacing between the
two vehicles where the requested vehicle will be placed. Follower i synchronises
with the leader via join-agr-c channel. Then the leader waits for an acknowl-
edgement from the requested agent. It waits for at most the upper bound time for
setting space, changing lane and getting close enough to the front vehicle. Upon
receipt of the acknowledgement, the leader sends a confirmation to the agent and a
“set spacing” command to the preceding agent to decrease its space with the front
vehicle to complete the joining procedure. If it does not receive the acknowledge-
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ment in time, it sends a “set spacing” command to the preceding agent to decrease
its space and waits for a spacing acknowledgement then goes back to the idle loca-
tion, ready for the next request. The leader communicates with the agents through
synchronisation channels. It passes messages to the follower through channels
dedicated to the agreements, setting space and switching steering controller. For
simplicity, we assume the leader handles only one request at any time, to avoid the
unsafe situation of simultaneous joining and leaving operations that are described
in Section 2.
Fig. 8: The leader Automaton
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4.5. Multi-agent Platooning Verification using Uppaal
Now we have timed automata representations of the platoon, we can carry out
verification of their properties using Uppaal. For simplicity, we analyse the global
and timing properties of a multi-agent platoon composed simply of a leader and
three vehicles (with three corresponding) agents. However, the verification can
perform for arbitrary length of platoon by simply instantiating more vehicles and
agents. We assume vehicles can always set spacing and joining distance in time,
i.e., 10 ± 5, but can fail to change lane in time, i.e., less than 20 + 5. In the
following, we first give examples of global properties involving the coordination
between the leader and the followers. Second, we evaluate timing requirements:
the safe lower and upper bounds for joining and leaving activities. We observed
that the verification of these properties took less than 3 seconds using Uppaal.
The reason is that the behaviour of the system is sequential and the interleaving
is restricted in the leader automaton. Unreliable communication is not acceptable
for automotive platoons and if such errors are detected the platoon is dissolved.
Therefore, we did not consider communication errors in our automata; however,
the changing lane failure can occur. The leader automaton detects the failure when
it does not receive any acknowledgement in due time and readjusts the platoon and
going back to idle state, i.e., ready for the next request.
If an agent ever receives a joining agreement from the leader, then the preced-
ing agent has increased its space to its front agent. This property is formulated for
agent a3 as follows (A represents “on all paths”):
A2 ((a3.rdy ch lane && l.joining vehicle.front == 2)
imply ( a2.incr spacing && a2.spacing done))
(8)
where a3 is the agent which is in the rdy ch lane location, i.e, the agent has
received a joining agreement, variable joining vehicle.front indicates the iden-
tification of the preceding agent, flag a2.incr spacing models that the preceding
agent has received an “increase space” command from the leader and, finally, flag
a2.spacing done models whether agent a2 has successfully increased its space.
Flag a2.spacing done turns true when a2 and leader are synchronised through
set spacing from channel, i.e., the leader is informed that a2 has successfully
increased space. We can also verify this property for agents a2 and a4. Property 8
is a safety requirement ensuring that a vehicle initiates “changing lane” only if
sufficient spacing is provided.
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The next property of interest is whether a joining request always ends up in-
creasing space of the preceding vehicle. To express this property, we use the leads
to property form, written '  . It states that whenever ' is satisfied, then even-
tually  will be satisfied. Such properties are written as ' 99K  in Uppaal. We
verify the property (9) to show that whenever agent a3 is in the wait j agr loca-
tion, i.e., has sent a joining request, and agent a2 is the preceding vehicle in the
platoon, then eventually a3 will receive an increasing space command and will
perform the action.
(a3.waiting for j agr && l.joining vehicle.front == 2)
99K ( a2.incr spacing && a2.spacing done) (9)
To ensure that the spacing always decreases after a joining procedure, i.e., platoon
returns back to a normal state, we verify that if ever the leader receives a joining
request, it eventually sends a decreasing space command to the preceding agent
unless the joined agent is the final one in the platoon.
A2 ((a3.join completed && l.joining vehicle.front == 2)
imply ( !a2.incr spacing && a2.spacing done))
(10)
Given the required time for a vehicle to carry out “set spacing”, “joining distance”
and “changing lane” tasks, we are interested in verifying if an agent accomplishes
joining the platoon within an expected interval: waiting time for agreement +
changing lane + joining distance + waiting time for leader confirmation, repre-
sented in Property 11.
A2 (a2.join completed imply
(a2.process time   50 && a2.process time  90)) (11)
Similarly, we check if an agent leaves a platoon within an expected interval: wait-
ing time for agreement + changing lane + waiting time for leader confirmation.
Waiting time for agreement is equal to the time needed to set space and waiting
time for leader confirmation is zero because we assume switching steering con-
trollers is immediate.
A2 (a2.leave completed imply
(a2.process time   30 && a2.process time  50)) (12)
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4.6. Validating the Verification
Within our formal approach a range of abstractions are used, many being over-
approximations. Practical simulation and testing is crucial, not only to validate the
system being developed, but also to validate these abstractions. If, for example, we
find a property that does not hold we must be sure that this is due to the system it-
self and not to a failure introduced through our abstraction process. Consequently,
we provide a close link between formal verification, simulation and (increasingly)
real-world testing. This is a general problem with all formal verification tech-
niques applied to real-world systems. Since we can never precisely formalise the
“real world” we must provide abstractions of the world and carry out verification
with these. The abstractions must in turn be validated to see if they capture most
of the viable real world behaviour. If they do not, then they will be refined and
verification again carried out.
It must be emphasised that the agent code that we verify is actually the code
that controls the vehicle, both in the TORCS simulation and in the real vehicle
that we are developing. An imperfect environmental abstraction can mask pos-
sible problems in an agent model in a way which even formal verification of the
agent including the environmental abstraction, fails to find. For instance, in the
first attempt to model the platooning agent model, the environmental abstraction
always delivered a change lane perception when a change lane action had been
requested. This disguised the lack of required plans for the agent to deal with
situations where a vehicle failed to change lane. The inappropriate abstraction
was detected during simulation and provided means to refine the environmental
abstraction and consequently the agent model. Thus, as long as the environmental
abstractions are correct, we can be sure of the decisions made by the agent.
This clearly leaves the question of whether the environmental abstractions are
appropriate or not. This is not something that can be handled by formal verifica-
tion and so it is here that we utilise validation, both through TORCS simulation
and physical vehicle tests. These help us assess how realistic and appropriate the
abstractions we use are, and provide the impetus to refine these if necessary.
5. Concluding Remarks
The verification of safety considerations for automotive platooning is a diffi-
cult task. There are several reasons for this.
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• These are non-trivial hybrid autonomous systems, with each vehicle mixing
feedback controllers and agent decision-making.
• There is a strong requirement to verify the actual code used in the imple-
mentation, rather than extracting a formal model of the program’s behaviour
— this leads on to program model-checking, which is resource intensive.
• Rational agents are essential for capturing high-level autonomy and, as there
are no other practical systems able to model-check temporal and modal
properties of complex BDI agents, we are led to AJPF.
• AJPF is very resource intensive (as we have seen, 12 hours for some agent
properties) and cannot be practically used to verify whole system properties
of automotive platooning.
• Especially when interacting with real vehicles we need to verify timed prop-
erties, as timing considerations can be crucial.
Thus it is perhaps not surprising that such formal verification has never been re-
ported before. In order to address all of the above concerns, we have adopted a
combined strategy. We use AJPF to verify individual agent properties, given re-
alistic abstractions of environmental interactions. AJPF verification is viable for
individual agents, though remains resource hungry. We then abstract from the
BDI code and produce an abstract agent automaton suitable for use in Uppaal ver-
ification. We have shown how this can be carried out automatically, producing
smaller timed automata with the “internals” of autonomous decision-making re-
moved. Essentially, we remove the modelling of the decision-making process and
just leave the possible decisions that can be made. This then allows us to formally
verify platoon requirements and safety considerations, a sample of which we have
included.
5.1. Related Work
The California PATH project [35] has developed a design of platooning for in-
telligent highway systems. The design of manoeuvres which involve both discrete
and continuous behaviour forms a large complex hybrid system. Safety verifi-
cation of platooning has been discussed in [26, 30] where vehicle dynamics is
taken into account. A methodology for the design of safe hybrid controllers for
automated vehicles has been presented based on game theory and optimal con-
trol techniques. The focus is on finding the safe continuous control laws for the
leader and followers in different platoon manueuvers, e.g., join, split, lane change
and leave. For instance, it is shown in [26] that if a follower finds itself closer
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than s from the preceding vehicle, a collision might likely happen. A hybrid I/O
automaton approach has been applied to the platooning in [13] to describe and
verify safety of merge manoeuvre for platooning. The purpose in [13] is to en-
sure that two adjacent platoons can safely combine to form a single platoon. The
requirement for safe joining of two platoons is that the two platoons never col-
lide at a relative velocity greater than a given bound. Sufficient conditions on the
controller of the platoons are given to ensure the safety. The focus is on finding
the optimal velocity that ensures the safety for merging two adjacent platoons.
While a hybrid controller automata approach has been taken into account in these
works for safety verification of controllers, the aim of our study is just to verify
the high-level autonomous decision-making component of the hybrid system. Pre-
cisely, the hybrid automata approaches in [13, 26, 30] focus on multiple control
requirements that the controller has to strive to satisfy and abstract the required co-
ordination for different manueuvers; however, our approach addresses verification
of the coordination for different manueuvers.
A spatial interval logic has been presented in [20, 19] to abstract from the dy-
namics of vehicles to allow for spatial reasoning. The proposed logical framework
aims to prove collision freedom of lane-change manoeuvres by introducing a lo-
cal view of each vehicle. Similar to our approach, vehicle dynamics are separated
from spatial reasoning; however, the focus, in [20, 19], is on reasoning about con-
trollers not the high-level decision making component of the system. A framework
based on ⇡-calculus has been presented in [5] for formal modelling of high-level
decision making of platooning while the closed-loop control systems are modelled
using hybrid automata. As with our approach, the discrete and continuous aspects
of the system are separated, though no verification has been carried out in [5] to
ensure the correctness of the high-level decision making component.
A combined verification approach for vehicle platooning is proposed in [6]
where the system behaviour is specified via the CSP and B formal methods. The
approach in [6] is based on refinement in which a system is developed in a step-
wise manner. The vehicle behaviour is modelled as a B machine and the com-
munication models as a CSP controller. The aim in [6] is to represent a correct
model of a real physical vehicle for platooning while our approach aims to ver-
ifying the cooperation between vehicles in the automotive platoon and abstract
the behaviour of a real physical vehicle. A compositional verification approach
for vehicle platooning is introduced in [14] where feedback controllers and agent
decision-making are mixed.
It should be noted that to the best of our knowledge, there is no directly com-
parable work in literature where the actual agent code used in the implementation
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has been verified.
5.2. Future Work
There is clearly much future work to tackle. An obvious one is to continue
efforts to improve the efficiency of AJPF.
Maintaining a safe platoon in case of recoverable latency and dissolving a
platoon in the case of unrecoverable latency are two procedures that are not yet
implemented in our verified agent code. Adding these two procedures to the agent
grows the system space to the extent that AJPF fails to verify any property. Thus,
we are investigating an agent abstraction at the level of goals, beliefs and inten-
tions in order to use AJPF for verification of more complex agents.
Since we are concerned with certification of automotive platooning in prac-
tice, we are aiming to extract a more comprehensive list of formal properties from
official platoon requirement documents. Related to this, we are also in the pro-
cess of porting the agent architecture on to a real vehicle and so aim to continue
and extend testing of the platooning algorithms in both physical, and simulation,
contexts.
Finally, an important aspect of our two pronged strategy is to link the models
used in Uppaal to the programs that AJPF uses. We provided an algorithm to
achieve this but, in this paper we refined the Uppaal models by hand. Clearly, a
next step is to fully automate this process.
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